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STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS 






The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) will initiate its first performance-based 
logistics (PBL) contract in fiscal year 2010.  This first contract is an experiment in 
contracting with private firms to provide direct support for military forces. Performance-
based logistics is a very new concept for the Japan Self Defense Force, and many policy 
issues remain unaddressed. The purpose of this Master’s project is to explore the critical 
strategic and operational risks and benefits that the JMSDF should consider concerning 
outsourcing public functions.  This project identifies aspects of the experiences of the 
United States with performance-based logistics and how the JMSDF might learn from 
these experiences in order to emulate successes where conditions allow and avoid critical 
mistakes and failures.  
This study analyzes publicly available literature and documentation on 
performance-based logistics contracting, as well as contractor logistics support 
contracting, to develop a summary of the U.S. experience with PBL. We analyzed 37 
articles to summarize their findings and claims with regard to cost, performance, 
performance measurement, risk, information systems, appropriateness of a particular 
weapon system for PBL implementation, and organizational capability to evaluate, 
implement and manage a PBL contract. 
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I. PREFACE  
The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) 1  will initiate its first 
performance-based logistics (PBL) contract in fiscal year 2010. This first contract is an 
experiment in contracting with private firms to provide direct support for military forces. 
Performance-based logistics is a very new concept for the Japan Self Defense Force, and 
many policy issues remain unaddressed. The purpose of this Master’s project is to 
explore the critical strategic and operational risks and benefits that the JMSDF should 
consider concerning outsourcing public functions. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many domestic laws, regulations and rules affect PBL in Japan. It is difficult for 
the Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD) to change national laws, because those laws cover 
entire ministries and offices. Although some laws contain exceptions for the military—
such as the Civil Aeronautics Law, the Law for Controlling the Possession of Firearms or 
Swords and Other Such Weapons, and the Fire and Disaster Management Law—
acquisition- and contract-related laws have no exceptions for the military. National laws 
should be thought of as immutable regulations governing the establishment, funding and 
management of PBL contracts. On the other hand, regulations and rules created by the 
MoD can be amended, and we may assume that such regulations and rules will be 
changed so that PBL contracts may be used. In this project, we will treat national laws as 
constraints on PBL contract design, implementation and management, while rules and 
regulations established by the MoD will be considered flexible with respect to 
implementing PBL.  
B. BACKGROUND 
A general understanding of the laws, regulations and rules that apply to military 
contracts in general, and performance-based contracts in particular, is necessary at the 
outset of any discussion of public contracting. We will first discuss how a PBL contract 
                                                 
1 JMSDF: Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is the national naval military service of Japan.  
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works and some of the legal issues surrounding such a contract, and then discuss why the 
JMSDF wants to implement such contracts. Finally, we will introduce the supply and 
contract organizations in the JMSDF, and discuss their role in creating and governing 
such contracts. 
1. Definition of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
A PBL contract is an outcome-based performance approach to contracting for 
logistics support of weapon systems that has become increasingly popular within the 
defense sector of both the United Kingdom and United States. Traditionally, both the 
public and private sectors have established contracts for specific equipment, parts, and 
labor and then managed these inputs to achieve a specific management target. 
Performance-based logistics contracts differ from this approach, in that they purchase a 
performance outcome such as an availability rate, an on-time delivery or fill rate, or a 
reliability rate such as mean time between failure (MTBF) or mean flight hours between 
unscheduled removals (MFHBUR), based upon an assumed or forecasted operating 
tempo and set of operating conditions. The theory behind the performance-based logistics 
contract is that by purchasing an outcome both customers and suppliers share risk. For 
example, in a traditional contracting arrangement, customers might contract for the 
purchase of spare parts and keep inventory so that they have enough on-hand to achieve a 
stated performance goal and achieve their missions. However, in a PBL contract, the 
supplier provides an outcome and therefore takes on a portion of the risk associated with 
the contract in the form of inventory, which they would ideally own.2  
Performance-based logistics is about not only risk sharing, but also cost reduction 
and higher performance. One of the biggest reasons why the JMSDF wants to implement 
PBL is to reduce cost. Although there is a popular claim that PBL contracts compress 
costs, evidence to the contrary exists. For example, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) points out that the evidence of cost reductions by PBL contracts within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is not clear (GAO, 2008).   With respect to performance, 
many analyses show how PBL improves outcomes. For example, the U.S. Department of 
                                                 
2 If the supplier does not own the inventory, then the incentive to improve reliability is reduced.  
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Defense Inspector General found improvements in availability, reliability, training 
opportunity, and Navy depot workload and product for the SH-60 helicopter (DoD 
Inspector General, 2006). 3   However, the public literature contains no conclusive 
evidence that demonstrates an increase in performance coincident with a reduction in 
costs.  In other words, some studies and documents claim reductions in cost and others 
claim improvements in performance but little evidence supports a cost for performance 
measure that conclusively demonstrates an improvement in performance while reducing 
costs.  
2. Mechanism of PBL 
The key features of a PBL contract are cost reduction and performance 
improvement, which are achieved through a carefully selected set of performance targets 
and metrics, mechanisms to measure performance, and appropriate incentives or 
disincentives associated with each performance target. Normally, higher cost and higher 
performance are positively correlated; in other words, the more you pay, the better 
performance you have, but the less you pay, the worse performance you have. However, 
the idea behind PBL is that you may achieve both cost reduction and performance 
improvement; the contract customers control the incentives of their suppliers while 
enjoying the seemingly contradictory benefits of performance improvement. 
There are many means of providing incentives to suppliers; one of the most 
popular is performance-based compensation. Under performance-based compensation, 
suppliers receive a bonus if they achieve a performance target. Another incentive is the 
long-term contract. Most contracts have a period of performance of less than one year 
(especially if the government is the customer) because, with some exceptions, the fiscal 
year is one year. As an example of one exception, DoD PBL contracts for H-60 
helicopters have terms ranging from 31 months to 10 years (Inspector General, 2006).  
 
 
                                                 
3 This report also stated that the selection of performance factors and measurement should be 
considered with more care. 
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Supplier disincentives in the contract may include a penalty (in the form of a fee or 
reduced customer payment) associated with a supplier’s failure to meet a performance 
target.  
3. PBL Implementation in JMSDF 
a. Motivation for the Implementation of PBL in the JMSDF 
Because of the recession, and the demands of taxpayers, the MoD plans to 
cut 15% of its acquisition costs through 2011. The JMSDF will try to achieve a 15% 
reduction in costs without having to reduce rates of operation and equipment utilization. 
The United States and Great Britain have been using the PBL concept, particularly for 
aviation assets, for several years. Aware of some of the success stories coming out of 
Great Britain and the U.S., the MoD established the “MoD Total Acquisition Reform 
Plan” in March 2008, which created laws and rules governing PBL for those contracts 
implemented after 2009. Shortly afterward, the Internal Bureau in MoD4 decided to fund 
a “Study to Reduce Cost for Equipment” in 2011 to investigate the present condition of 
equipment, as well as its logistics support strategy, and identify how other countries are 
reducing their costs (to include the use of PBL) and apply those methods where it is 
feasible. The JMSDF will begin its PBL pilot model in 2010 and implement a “Study of 
Optimum Maintenance for Logistics Systems” in 2011.  
b. PBL Pilot Model 
The JMSDF is planning to implement its PBL pilot model by applying a 
performance-based contract to the management of about ten repair parts for the MCH-
101 helicopter.5 In this PBL pilot model, the JMSDF plans to achieve a certain inventory  
 
 
                                                 
4 Internal Bureau in MoD is the organization that supports the Minister of Defense. Most of the 
members of Internal Bureau in MoD are civilian workers. 
5 The MCH-101 is a minesweeping, transportation, and anti-submarine patrol helicopter that is 
designed by EH Industries and produced by Agusta Westland in the United Kingdom. This helicopter is 
operated by five countries including Japan. Agusta Westland has a PBL contract with the Royal Navy and 
Royal Air Force as well as other nations (Agusta Westland, 2009). 
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level for the designated repair parts and have the contractor maintain that inventory; if 
inventory falls below the desired amount then the contractor will refill inventory within a 
specified time.   
 
Figure 1.   MCH-101 helicopter (From: Kawasaki Aerospace Company, 2010) 
The JMSDF chose the MCH-101 for a PBL pilot model based upon the 
following criteria: 
• the rate of operation of the MCH-101 is very low 
• the lead time of some parts is very long6 
• the proposed PBL contractor, Agusta Westland, produces the MCH-101 
and has experience with the weapon system, and 
• the PBL contract stakeholders are limited, because there are just two main 
suppliers, so it is easier for JMSDF to structure its organization around the 
PBL contract 
The budget for the PBL pilot model has already been approved by the 
Diet. During the PBL pilot, the JMSDF has established several conditions: 
 
                                                 
6  For example, the lead times of some parts are 20 months. 
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• the JMSDF will not provide performance-based compensation because it 
is difficult for the JMSDF to offer bonuses under current laws7 
• suppliers will have a long-term contract as an incentive8 
• should the number of aircraft increase, the JMSDF will offer repairable 
spare parts to the suppliers, and 
• suppliers will provide all necessary data to evaluate their performance to 
the JMSDF, and the JMSDF will evaluate the pilot model using a third 
party 
The JMSDF is conducting a cost-benefit analysis and contracting for the 
PBL pilot model using a third party contractor.  
c. PBL Implementation Plan 
The JMSDF plans to use its experience and lessons learned from the MCH-
101 and expand the PBL concept to other equipment should the pilot be successful. 
Currently, the JMSDF imagines using PBL contracts for the entire maintenance level of 
training aircraft, and for higher levels of maintenance (i.e., above shop level)9 of operating 
aircraft. 
Figure 2 shows the PBL implementation plan provided by the Maritime 
Materiel Command (MMC). According to this information, while the JMSDF will continue 
the PBL pilot model until 2014, they will apply results of the MCH-101 pilot to the Study of 
Optimum Maintenance Logistics Systems in 2011.  The Study of Optimum Maintenance 
Logistics Systems seeks to find the optimum maintenance and logistics practices (to include 
contracting maintenance out to private contractors) for all weapon systems and then 
coordinate contracts in 2012 for the P-1,10 TH-13511 and other platforms from 2013. 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, JMSDF will not establish a special penalty for failure to meet a performance 
target but instead claim a standard, normal penalty, which is 0.05 percent of the contract price per day if 
companies do not meet the established performance criteria. 
8 The long-term contract is desirable for the contractor because it allows them to make business 
expansion and long-term capital investment plans, as well as lock in contracts with their suppliers. 
9 Shop level maintenance is a kind of Inspection-level maintenance. In shop level maintenance, some 
assemblies or components are dismantled and inspected. 
10 The P-1 is a patrol aircraft of JMSDF, which is designed to replace P-3C patrol aircraft. The P-1 is 
manufactured by Kawasaki Heavy Industry and now it is under development. 
11 The TH-135 is an imported training helicopter of JMSDF. The TH-135 is manufactured by 
Eurocopter. 
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Fiscal  year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Plan Research and study
(Laws, regulations)
Study of Optimum 
Maintenance Logistics 
System








Implement Optimal Maintenance Logistics 
System (P-1, TH-135)P-1  
Figure 2.   PBL Implementation Plan (From: MMC, 2009) 
4. Key Laws Affecting PBL Use 
The key laws affecting PBL for the JMSDF are the Public Accounting Law, 
Public-Finance Law and State-Owned Articles Management Law. These laws never 
anticipated PBL contracts or the outsourcing of public functions to the private sector and, 
therefore, any implementation of an outsourcing contract such as PBL will likely run 
afoul of one or more of these laws. In 2010, the MoD will conduct a study to determine 
the impact of these laws on PBL and PBL implementation and then determine whether 
PBL may be implemented under the current laws or whether the laws need to be amended 
to accommodate PBL.  
a. Public-Finance Law 
The Public-Finance Law was enacted on March 31, 1947. This national 
law is the fundamental law governing public finance in Japan and establishes the types of 
budget, budget compilation and execution of payments permissible by public institutions. 
According to article 14-2, the government can execute budget expenditure over 
continuing fiscal years if the contract(s) requires more than one year to complete. In 
article 14-3, the law mentions that the Diet can extend the execution to more than 5 years, 
though normally there is a 5-year maximum. The theory behind PBL is that, with long-
term contracts, suppliers will be motivated to improve quality and lower their operating 
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costs, capturing the difference between the contract price and their reduced costs in the 
form of additional profit. However, until now, continuing expenditures beyond 1 year are 
used only for the construction of ships and submarines, so it is difficult to apply to PBL 
contracts. On the other hand, according to article 15, the government can use bond-
related expenditures (with approval from the Diet) for long-term contracts, but there is no 
precedent within the MoD for such an action.  
b. Public Accounting Law 
The Public Accounting Law was enacted on March 31, 1947. This 
national law states the procedures related to revenue, expenditure and contracts. 
According to article 9-11, the contract officer has to verify the completion of a contract; 
however, there is no contract officer who has the experience to verify performance, and 
indeed the JMSDF as a whole does not know how to evaluate performance. According to 
article 29-6, contract officers must decide how to establish a target price to select 
contractors, but current guidance is insufficient for contract officers to establish an 
appropriate price for performance. 
c. State-Owned Articles Management Law 
The State-Owned Articles Management Law was enacted on May 22, 
1956. This national law states the procedures to manage national assets. According to 
article 7, the Minister of Defense must manage MoD’s property in-house, so he cannot 
outsource the management of parts or assemblies to the commercial companies. In the 
PBL pilot model, the JMSDF provides each part to the company, so it can clear this law; 
in the future, however, this law will become a big barrier against PBL contracts. 
5. JMSDF Knowledge of PBL 
The JMSDF’s PBL knowledge is currently insufficient. Though there are many 
articles related to PBL in English, however these articles are invisible to anyone 
conducting a search in Japanese; furthermore, most Japanese cannot read well in English, 
so it is very difficult for Japanese military people to study about PBL by themselves. As a 
result, the JMSDF cannot help relying on third parties or private defense contractors.  
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The use of third-party private defense contractors offers the JMSDF a lot of 
beneficial information as a result of their long relationship and because they are experts 
in their weapon systems. However, the use of third parties presents some complications 
as well as it may be difficult for them to understand and fully integrate with all of the 
JMSDF’s unique systems, processes and legal requirements. Moreover, some third 
parties are not reliable. For example, a 2006 Nimrod crash in Afghanistan was attributed 
by some experts to a lazy third party contractor that did not supervise the maintenance 
properly and the customer was completely reliant on that third party for all maintenance 
expertise (Chuter, 2009). Further, the private firm’s fundamental goal and mission is to 
earn money whereas the fundamental goal and mission of the JMSDF is to defend the 
lives and property of the citizens of Japan and therefore there is a basic, structural conflict 
of interest between the two and the potential for bias that would favor the firm and 
compromise the JMSDF is real. In fact, the information presented by private defense 
contractors makes little mention of cost reduction, performance improvement or the 
potential risks associated with performance-based contracting (Saito, 2009; Eurocopter 
Japan, 2009). 
6. Supply and Contract Flow of JMSDF 
Figure 2 shows the supply and contract flow in the JMSDF. The Minister of 
Defense decides upon the overall goal, upon which the Chief of Staff, JMSDF, makes the 
general plan. The Maritime Material Command (MMC) procures, keeps and maintains 
materials that are used by the JMSDF and also conducts logistics research. The Ship 
Supply Depot (SSD) and Air Supply Depot (ASD) are managed by MMC. SSD performs 
acquisition, storage, supply and maintenance for ships while ASD performs the same 
activities for aircraft. Most contracts are made by SSD and ASD, and goods and services 
are sent from private defense contractors to squadrons via SSD or ASD. Ships and 
aircraft themselves are not procured through MMC, SSD or ASD but are acquired by the 


















Figure 3.   Supply and Contract Flow of JMSDF 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is currently difficult for the JMSDF to gain objective information or knowledge 
about PBL, which means that they cannot objectively assess costs, appropriately measure 
performance, or mitigate the potential risks when considering the implementation of a 
PBL contract. 
D. PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 
The purpose of this project is to identify aspects of the experiences of the United 
States with performance-based logistics and how the JMSDF might learn from these 
experiences in order to emulate successes where conditions allow and to avoid critical 
mistakes and failures.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are seven research questions that define this project’s purpose.  
• How should JMSDF measure and evaluate the cost of a PBL contract?  
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• How should JMSDF measure and evaluate the performance of a PBL 
contract? 
• How should JMSDF consider performance measurement? 
• What are the primary and secondary risks associated with the PBL concept as 
it pertains to the JMSDF and what measures can be taken to mitigate them?  
• What kind of information system(s) should JMSDF construct to manage PBL 
contracts? 
• What kind of criteria should JMSDF consider when determining whether to 
use a PBL support strategy for a particular weapon system? 
• How can JMSDF implement and evaluate PBL contracts after they are 
executed? 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT 
This project will help the JMSDF reduce risks associated with PBL contracts by 
highlighting the experiences of two countries that have been implementing PBL for 
several years. Additionally, this project will provide direct guidance and input to the 
JMSDF in their development of PBL policy. At present, only one military officer in the 
MMC is tasked to implement PBL contracts in JMSDF. The JMSDF needs input and 
recommendations on implementing PBL without relying solely on the materials and 
documents provided by private defense contractors.  
G. METHODOLOGY 
This study analyzes publicly available literature and documentation on 
performance-based logistics contracting, as well as contractor logistics support 
contracting, to develop a summary of the U.S. experience with PBL.  
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE 
We began by selecting 76 documents that included peer-reviewed research, 
Department of Defense guidance, and various public and private reports that directly 
addressed PBL, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) or outsourcing. Of the original 76 
documents, we chose 37 that described PBL implementation and outcomes based upon 
their research merit12 (see Appendix A). We analyzed these 37 articles to summarize 
their findings and claims with regard to cost, performance, performance measurement, 
risk, information systems, appropriateness of a particular weapon system for PBL 
implementation, and organizational capability to evaluate, implement and manage a PBL 
contract. 
A. COST 
Eighteen articles directly addressed cost. The PBL literature contains not only 
claims of cost efficiency and reductions in total ownership cost, but also calls for more 
research and better data to assess whether, in fact, the theoretical claims made about PBL 
can be realized.   
Many organizations expect to save total ownership costs by implementing PBL 
(Keating & Huff, 2005; Reeve, 2001). Cohen (2007) found that cost-sharing support and 
maintenance services can generate "up to seven times as much profit as do sales of 
original products over the lifetime of product use to the contractors.” The Japan MoD and 
JMSDF also expect cost reduction and compression of the supply chain. Theoretically, 
outsourcing reduces costs, because many people think that the public sector is far more 
inefficient than the private sector (Sink, 1997). Further, officials inside the U.S.  DoD 
claim they can reduce costs by implementing PBL (Ahern, 2004; Secretary of Defense, 
2004).  In a theoretical paper by Tallant, Martin, and Hedrick (2008) the authors claim 
that the cost efficiency of PBL contracts is high.  Cost efficiency refers to the 
effectiveness of action or performance outcome relative to the absolute cost. 
                                                 
12 The other 37 documents not included in the literature analysis were contractor-developed 
documents that were little more than corporate advertisements or broad, simplistic overviews of PBL as a 
concept. 
 14
Theoretically, an award for good performance gives the supplier an incentive to improve 
in cost and performance thereby increasing the cost efficiency of the contract. Cohen 
(2007) and Kim, Cohen and Netessine (2007) have shown, through principal-agent 
models, the increase in cost efficiency as a result of a performance award.  However, 
Cohen (2007) also observed that, while it is fair to assume that one must invest money to 
make money, it is not clear how to determine the appropriate amount of payment and 
expected cost savings for a PBL contract.  
In those rare cases where it is acknowledged that PBL may increase costs it is 
argued that it is a result of a premium for the additional risk contractors share as part of 
the contract (Nowicki, Verma & Parry, 2008).  It is has also been suggested that highly 
reliable systems may have high performance contracting costs.  Highly reliable 
equipment is often equipment that is also critical and its failure may not only represent a 
surprise event but also a time sensitive repair requirement for an organization. Because 
suppliers must be prepared to respond and repair the equipment quickly, there may be 
significant costs involved. On the other hand, highly reliable equipment may rarely break 
down and in a PBL contract this means the customer may feel as though they are paying 
without any services actually being rendered (Kim, Cohen, Netessine & Veeraraghavan, 
2008).  
Despite many claims that PBL can reduce costs, no documented evidence exists 
for such cost savings (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2008b; Inspector General, Department of 
Defense, 2004; Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2006; Landreth, Wilhelm & 
Corporon, 2005; Tallant, Martin & Hedrick, 2008). Not only is empirical evidence of cost 
savings through the use of PBL contracts lacking, there is no way to predict future cost 
reductions as a result of PBL implementation.  While a performance award provides an 
incentive for suppliers to lower costs, there is very little systematic tracking of costs and 
performance. Individual military services have difficulty calculating total costs for their 
programs, particularly infrastructure support costs (Inspector General, Department of 
Defense, 2003). Additionally no statistical evidence supports a relationship between 
contract performance and the performance award (Kirk & DePalma, 2005).  It is widely 
agreed, based upon empirical studies,  that more cost data are needed, both in quantity 
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and quality, to evaluate cost appropriately and to price PBL correctly (Boito, Cook & 
Graser, 2009; Cohen & Nunes, 2008; Coryell, 2007; Department of the Navy, 2007; 
Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2003).  The cost data required, for both PBL 
and non-PBL contracts, includes inventory and equipment costs as well as training costs, 
salaries and management fees, and facilities for both equipment and personnel.  
B. PERFORMANCE 
Ten articles directly address PBL performance. Performance improvement is one 
of the primary reasons the JMSDF would like to implement PBL. Ahern (2004) states 
that PBL can improve weapon system performance, however, this is simply a claim and 
very little empirical evidence backs the statement. The Inspector General, Department of 
Defense (2006) conducted an empirical investigation into H-6013 helicopters and found 
that availability, reliability, training opportunities workload and product was improved by 
using PBL. The GAO has also found instances of  PBL improving performance (GAO, 
December 2008). However, other studies have pointed out that PBL may not be 
achieving the goals of improving readiness for major weapon systems (Inspector General, 
Department of Defense, 2004). An empirical study of Auxiliary Power Units14 found that 
reliability did not improve through the use of  PBL (Landreth, Wilhelm & Corporon, 
2005). Statistically, 52.1 percent of customers have noted a service-level improvement by 
outsourcing logistics functions, but 33.8 percent of customers felt that time and effort 
spent on logistics did not decrease (Sink & Langley, 1997). 
The business case analysis (BCA) is the primary instrument for determining 
whether a performance-based logistics contract should be considered and it is also the 
document that must be reviewed to determine whether the contract is performing as 
expected. However, it is not clear what cost elements should be in a BCA (there is no 
standard); nor has there been clear guidance from the Department of Defense on how the 
BCA should be constructed. Individual services are creating their own guidance and 
                                                 
13 H-60: H-60 is one of the most popular military helicopters in the world. U.S. Army, Navy, Air 
Force and JMSDF use this type of helicopter. 
14 Auxiliary Power Unit: Auxiliary Power Unit is a small engine on an airplane that supplies electric 
power and compressed air when the main engines are not working. 
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standards for BCAs. In those instances where there were BCAs conducted and a PBL 
contract was used, the BCA was not always updated, validated or verified.  
The BCA is a set of methods to evaluate performance and help to make decisions 
in PBL implementation. The governmental organization must first define what should be 
included in a business case analysis and establish specific criteria and methods for 
evaluating PBL support. The BCA should be updated frequently during the lifecycle of 
the weapon system (GAO, December 2008; Ausink, Baldwin, Hunter & Shirley, 2002) 
and data should be collected in a standardized format (GAO, December 2008). The BCA 
should analyze PBL not only under peacetime operation but also under wartime 
operational scenarios and operating tempos, otherwise it will fail to capture the full costs 
of the contract should there be war (Coryell, 2007).  
An analysis of the PBL literature shows that performance measures, as well as 
their implementation and use, are heterogeneous. In some cases of PBL implementation, 
performance has not been measured. Kirk and  DePalma (2005) found performance 
measurement to be critical in order to implement an effective PBL contract. However, in 
many cases, the government finds it difficult to establish measurable performance 
standards (Ausink, Baldwin, Hunter & Shirly, 2002). And while Buyukgural (2009) and 
Sols, Nowicki and Verma (2008) have developed mathematic models to measure 
performance, Kirk and DePalma (2005) insist that empirical performance data are 
required to evaluate PBL contracts.  
C. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Eighteen articles directly addressed performance measurement. The literature of 
military PBL implementations addressed performance metrics in the following way. 
1. Variety of Performance Metrics 
Performance metrics can be classified as effectiveness (which includes 
availability, readiness, reliability and customer feeling), efficiency and response time. 
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a. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness describes how the goal is accomplished (Mentzer & Konrad, 
1991). Effectiveness includes availability, readiness, reliability and customer feeling. 
Setting effectiveness goals is very important for PBL, because without them, we cannot 
assess the applicability of PBL (Sols, Nowicki & Verma, 2008).  Because this study 
addresses aviation, these effectiveness metrics are described in aviation terms. 
(1) Availability: Availability is “the percent of time that a system 
is available for a mission or the ability to sustain operations tempo” (Buyukgural, 2009). 
Some studies found that the “numerator of availability is not and should not be 
translatable to dollars” because, especially in the military, the mission is not monetary 
benefit (Doerr, Lewis & Eaton, 2005). Availability metrics include:  
• Partially mission-capable supply: “The percentage of time an aircraft can 
fly at least one but not all of its missions for reasons attributed to supply” 
(Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
• Not mission-capable supply: “The percentage of time an aircraft is 
grounded and cannot fly any of its missions for reasons attributed to 
supply” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
• Mission-incapable awaiting parts: “The percentage of time that an aircraft 
is unable to perform its assigned mission because of a lack of parts” 
(Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
• Aircraft availability: “Mission-capable hours divided by total possessed 
hours” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 38) 
• Mission-capable rate: “The percentage of all possessed aircraft capable of 
fulfilling at least one of their assigned missions” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 
2009, p. 38) 
• System availability and sub-system availability: The rate that shows how 
many hours we could use particular system or sub-system per total 
ownership time (Kim, Cohen & Netessine, 2007) 
• Operational availability: The rate that shows how many hours we could 
conduct operations per total operation demand (Nowicki, Verma & Parry, 
2008) 
(2) Readiness: Readiness is the rate of availability of parts or 
equipment. It is different from availability, because readiness does not always affect 
mission capability.  Readiness measures include: 
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• Issue effectiveness: “The percentage of customer requests that have been 
filled by items in the inventory; includes the fulfillment of any request, not 
just requests for items the supply is authorized to stock” (Boito, Cook & 
Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
• Stockage effectiveness: “The percentage of customer requests filled by 
items that the supply system is authorized to stock” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 
2009, p. 36) 
• On-time fill rates: The rate that customer could get some parts or 
equipment on time (Kirk & DePalma, 2005, p. 27) 
(3) Reliability: “Reliability is the measure of a system in meeting 
mission success objectives” (Buyukgural, 2009) 
• Mean time between repairs: “Flying hours divided by repair actions” 
(Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
• Mean time between failure (MTBF): “A basic measure of reliability for 
reparable items; the average amount of time that all parts of an item 
perform within their specified limits” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36; 
Kirk & DePalma, 2005, p. 27) 
• Break rates (BR): “The number of breaks, defined as landings with write-
ups requiring major maintenance that ground the aircraft, per sortie” 
(Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 37) 
• Mean Flight Hours Between Removals (MFHBR)): The average number of 
flight hours before particular parts are removed. MFHBR includes regular 
maintenance and contingency maintenance (Kirk & DePalma, 2005, p. 27 
  
• Mean Flight Hours Between Unscheduled Removals (MFHBUR): The 
average number of flight hours before particular parts are removed. 
MFHBUR exclude regular maintenance (Kirk & Depalma, 2005, p. 27) 
• Mission reliability: The rate that shows number of successful missions per 
total number of missions (Nowicki, Verma & Parry, 2008) 
• Mean down time: Mean time during which particular system could not be 
used (Nowicki, Verma & Parry, 2008) 
(4) Customer feelings: One of the metrics to measure availability, 
readiness and reliability is customer feelings. Customer feelings can be very important—
if a squadron feels that the service provided is very convenient (or inconvenient) then this 
is useful feedback from a resource allocation and overall management standpoint. 
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However, customer feelings are often ignored, especially when the service is provided by 
the government, to the government. To measure human behavior is difficult, so we tend 
to skip these measurements (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991). 
• Customer satisfaction: Customers feel satisfaction when their objective is 
fulfilled (Lambert & Burduroglu, 2000) 
• Customer-value added: Customer-value added is “perceived value of 
company’s offer” divided by “perceived value of competitive offers” 
(Lambert & Burduroglu, 2000) 
b. Efficiency  
Efficiency “is the measure of how well the resources expended are 
utilized” (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991).  Efficiency metrics include: 
(1) Cost per Unit Usage: “The total operating cost divided by the 
appropriate unit of measurement for a given system” (Buyukgral, 2009, p. 24) 
(2) Logistics footprint: “The Government/contractor size or 
presence of deployed logistics support required to deploy, sustain and move a system.  
The measurable elements of logistics footprint include inventory/equipment, personnel, 
facilities, transportation assets and real estate” (Buyukgral, 2009, p. 24). 
c. Response Time 
Response time is the time needed to draw output from some input. 
Response time metrics identified in the literature include:  
(1) Repair turnaround time: “A measure of the length of time to 
repair an item and return it to the stock system” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, p. 36) 
(2) Mean time to repair: “A basic measure  of  maintainability:  the 
total maintenance time divided by total number of failures” (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009, 
p. 37) 
(3) Logistics response time: “The period of time from logistics 
demand signal sent to satisfaction of that logistics demand. ‘Logistics demand’ refers to 
systems, components, or resources (including labor) required for system logistics 
support” (Buyukgral, 2009, p. 24). 
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2. Key Issue for Performance Measurement 
Studies have suggested steps for implementing performance metrics. They are: 1) 
Select Performance Metrics, 2) Establish Baseline Values for Each Performance Metric, 
3) Set Target Values for Each Performance Metric, 4) Define an n-Dimensional Reward 
Scheme, and 5) Measure the Actual Effectiveness (Sols, Nowicki & Verma, 2008). 
Because of the number of available metrics, we must carefully consider which metrics we 
should use. Good measurement should 1) cover all aspects of the process being 
measured, 2) be appropriate for each situation, 3) be applied in a way that minimizes 
measurement error, and 4) be consistent with the management reward system (Mentzer & 
Konrad, 1991). After we select metrics, however, if they do not work well, we must 
replace them as necessary (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991). One of the biggest keys to 
succeeding in PBL is to select appropriate metrics that represent the system well, because 
metrics are the fundamental tools with which to evaluate PBL (Kim, Cohen, Netessine & 
Veeraraghavan, 2008; Landreth, Wilhelm & Corporon, 2005; Sols, Nowicki & Verma, 
2008). Of course, the government should set goals for each metric, specifying the 
performance data that should be collected (Cohen, 2007). 
3. Problems of Measurement 
Measurement is very important for PBL management, but there are some pitfalls 
that include: 
a. Difficulty of Determining Measurable Performance Standards 
One study found that it was difficult to determine "measurable 
performance standards” (Ausink, Baldwin, Hunter & Shirley, 2002). For example, human 
behavior is difficult to measure, so we tend to skip these measurements though they are 
very important (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991). 
b. Comparability of Measurement 
Some metrics do not fit for all situations, so we often have to modify those 
metrics (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991). For example, if we want to evaluate the maintenance 
performance of an aircraft engine, we may use flight hours for the denominator of the 
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metric because the engine is working during flight, but if we want to evaluate the APU 
then flight hours may not be the appropriate denominator because the APU is not 
working during flight.  
c. Measurement Error 
Because it is difficult to find out what factors affect certain results, we 
sometimes collect inappropriate data (Mentzer & Konrad, 1991). 
 
































Fourteen articles in the literature reviewed directly addressed risk. According to 
Spekman and Davis(2004), “risk is defined as the probability of variance in an expected 
outcome.” The literature reviewed concerning military PBL implementations addresses 
risk in the following way. 
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1. Risk in Supply Chain 
Traditionally, risk permeates the supply chain, including such areas as inventory 
management, transportation, and financing. The best solution to allocating risk among the 
supply chain (or channel) members can be achieved if channel members are risk-neutral 
and the second-best solution involves a contract that combines a fixed payment, a cost-
sharing incentive, and a performance incentive (Kim, Cohen & Netessine, 2007). Some 
PBL contracts may transfer supply chain risks from customers to suppliers (Cohen, 2007; 
Keating & Huff, 2005); therefore, suppliers demand a risk premium (Cohen, & Nines, 
2008). The degree of risk transformation from customers to suppliers depends on the 
degree of authority or agency granted to the supplier in the PBL contract (Doerr, Lewis & 
Eaton, 2005). That means that if the customer gives more authority to the supplier, more 
risk will transfer from customer to supplier. However, the ultimate party responsible for 
any problems or failures in the supply chain is the government.  
2. Contractor Technical Standards May Become Lower 
Because of the heavy competition in cost, the government may accept lower 
standards of technology and accept higher and unrecognized risks (Tallant, Martin & 
Hedrick, 2008). One study found risk in not realizing the full capability and quality of 
third-party employees providing logistics services, due to inadequate managerial systems 
within the service-providing firm (Sink & Langley, 1997). 
3. Ethics of Contractors 
One study found that there are contractors and third parties who did not work in 
an appropriate manner or worked in a manner that was unethical (Chuter, 2009). In PBL 
contracts, suppliers get money by achieving performance such as availability; without 
quality metrics in a contract, suppliers may cut corners just to achieve performance, even 
if such corner-cutting could or does result in a significant mishap.  
4. Skill Drain 
As a form of outsourcing, PBL will necessarily transfer public sector work to the 
commercial sector, which means skilled manpower will drain from the public military to 
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the private civilian sector (Chuter, 2009). If PBL is applied to an entire weapon system, it 
may erode skills that currently military personnel have, because PBL will reduce their 
jobs, and therefore make it much more difficult to regain that organic capability should it 
be desired to do so in the future (GAO, 2008b; Reeve, 2001). Skills include not only 
technical skills but also management skills and once those skills are eroded, it is very 
costly to replace them (Chuter, 2009).  
5. Risks Related to Cost 
Any use of the weapon system beyond the contracted hours increases costs 
significantly and also requires negotiation of a modification to the existing contract; this 
is a risk that is borne by the government and contractor to varying degrees, depending 
upon how the contract is written. If the renegotiation takes time or is expensive, it may 
have an adverse impact on operations (Kirk & Depalma, 2005; Reeve, 2001). Second, 
"CLS contracts often guarantee a large amount of funding to the contractor in each fiscal 
year [and]this limits the flexibility of the government to reduce funding levels without 
violating the terms of the contract" (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009). A third risk is 
associated with pricing the contract correctly, so analyzing the financial risk of a 
performance-based contract is a critical skill (Cohen & Nunes, 2008). 
6. Capability to Assess PBL 
If PBL is applied to an entire weapon system, the customer often lacks 
maintenance and logistics data to analyze PBL without cost (Boito, Cook & Graser, 
2009). It is not unreasonable to assume that suppliers would charge significant sums of 
money to provide such data if they enjoyed a monopoly on such information. 
Additionally, if the customer cannot acquire those data, their BCA becomes unreliable 
(Kirk & DePalma, 2005). This presents a paradox, because the bigger the PBL contract 
becomes, the more difficulty the customer may have in conducting a BCA – meaning 
they may not be able to assess PBL appropriately or with any reasonable level of 
confidence. 
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7. Security of Information System 
In PBL, data exchange and information sharing with contractors may be 
significant. When data sensitive information is shared between the government and an 
outside organization security problems are likely to occur (Spekman & Davis, 2004). 
8. Contract Change 
Some PBL contracts are fixed price contracts, and those prices are calculated 
by historical data. However, in PBL contracts for airplanes, if flight hours go up 
significantly because of deployment or some other reasons, suppliers will have huge 
deficits. As a result, the contractor may demand a change to the contract rather than face 
an adverse financial impact that might damage the firm or cause them to go out of 
business. (Kirk & DePalma, 2005)  
9. Risk in Wartime 
In wartime, contractors are not authorized to directly engage in armed battle and 
therefore require protection; this becomes a significant burden for combat squadrons, as 
they need additional force protection in order to provide safety to contractors (GAO, 
2008b; Reeve, 2001). There are also considerable limitations on the timeframe for 
deploying contractors because they may not enter a particular area until the military 
commander assesses that area as safe (Reeve, 2001). 
E. INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Four articles directly addressed the information system for PBL. The information 
system is important in order for the customer and supplier to maintain the efficiency and 
competitiveness of PBL and to be able to evaluate it. The literature on military PBL 
implementations addresses the information system in the following way. 
1. Information System to Improve PBL 
Necessary data should be distributed to all PBL contractors, because currently, 
individual suppliers tend to keep most of data to themselves and subcontractors can only  
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access those contracts that are less attractive. However, if subcontractors could access 
those data, they would also be able to compete in some parts of PBL (Secretary of 
Defense, 2004).  
2. Information System to Keep Ability 
The information system is very convenient for tracking cost data. The customer 
should make efforts to collect standardized data to track the status of PBL efforts, so as to 
maintain the capability for continuous PBL evaluation (GAO, 2008; Inspector General, 
Department of Defense, 2004). Currently, GAO insists that customers should get benefit 
from IUID15 and passive RFID16 to grasp how materials are used and to have cost data 
(GAO, 2009). 
F. WEAPON SYSTEM 
Six articles directly addressed weapon system selection for PBL. Some studies 
insisted that converting all contracts to PBL is not optimal (Cohen, 2007). For example, if 
we want to make one-time, short-term contract, PBL may not fit. The contract may expire 
without any benefit for the customer because of the short term, or the supplier may not 
achieve a certain performance level because they have insufficient time to apply their 
skills. The literature of military PBL implementation addresses weapon system selection 
in the following way. 
1. Four Levels of PBL Contracts 
There are four levels for PBL: Level 1: components such as aircraft tires, Level 2: 
major subsystems such as aircraft engines, Level 3: platform availability such as F-117 
Nighthawk, and Level 4: Mission, setting the stage for the future—achieving true pay for 
performance such as the Army shadow tactical unmanned aerial vehicle program. The 
government should consider what kind of work it will give to the contractors for each 
level (Vitasek, Cothran, Geary & Rutner, 2006). 
                                                 
15 IUID: IUID stands for Item Unique Identification. This system is used by DoD to identify 
individual parts or equipment. 
16 RFID: RFID stands for Radio Frequency Identification. This system can identify individual parts, 
boxes, or vehicles that have passive or active RFID tag. 
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2. Criteria of Theoretical Studies 
Doerr, Lewis and Eaton (2005) suggest that PBL is good for those markets where, 
the system has external markets for services, the system has clear and objective outcomes 
to measure and contractors may be better equipped and able to support high technology 
or short lifecycle technology than the government. By using contractors, we can reduce 
the burden of maintaining modern, complicated equipment, because contractors can cover 
the whole life cycle of particular equipment and they can have strategic advantages in 
technology. This technical advantage helps PBL efficiency (Reeve, 2001). 
On the other hand, PBL may not be efficient if we apply it to highly reliable 
systems (Kim, Cohen, Netessine & Veeraraghavan, 2008). Those systems may need no 
after-service during the entire contract term and, once broken, often have high systems 
costs. The result is that those contracts become very high risk/high return, which is not 
good for the customer or supplier. 
3. Criteria of U.S. Military Experience 
The U.S. Navy prefers to use PBL for expensive or delicate items, those for which 
readiness is a critical issue, and hard to manage candidates. It also says that “there must 
be a vendor who is willing to contract with the customer” and “the vendor must be 
affordable to the customer” (Kirk & DePalma, 2005). In the U.S. Air Force, newer 
aircraft tend to use PBL more than older aircraft (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009).   
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY  
Sixteen articles directly addressed organizational capability. The literature on 
military PBL implementations addressed organizational capability in the following way. 
1. Implementing PBL 
At first, the customer should define the roles and responsibilities of contractors 
and government employees, which means defining when we should use contractors under 
what situation (GAO, 2008b). Once the customer decides to implement PBL, it should 
understand how suppliers do things, so that the customer can craft a solid contract with 
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suppliers (Ausink, Camm & Cannon, 2009). To do that, the customer needs to consider 
an in-depth evaluation of various agencies’ use of performance-based contracting as it 
proceeds with this effort (GAO, 2002). Furthermore, the government needs to have a 
better understanding of how commercial firms have successfully implemented 
performance-based services acquisition (Ausink, Camm & Cannon, 2009). Managing 
suppliers is a critical capability that the organization must have in order for PBL to be 
effective (Cohen & Nunes, 2008).  
PBL guidance and training requirements should be established so that all 
managers who take charge of PBL can follow these steps because, normally, those 
managers change frequently. If high turnover results in lost knowledge, PBL becomes 
inefficient  (Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2004; Mendoza & Devlin, 2005). 
Nowicki, Verma and Parry (2008) found that the government should consider the 
following when making contracts:   
Clearly define the system for which support is sought; 
Include definition of boundaries, primary external interfaces, definition of 
primary system elements such as hardware, software, human actions and activities, and; 
Include details of support objectives, contract exclusions, system operational life, 
mission profiles and durations, measures of performance which includes frequency of 
measurement, continuity of key personnel and identify key focal points. 
2. Evaluating PBL  
The customer should have the ability to analyze current situations, such as 
manpower, organizational effectiveness and real cost (Tallant, Martin & Hedrick, 2008). 
To analyze current situations, the customer should obtain necessary PBL data (Boito, 
Cook & Graser, 2009). BCA guidance should be established, because it can give the 
customer the ability to evaluate PBL (Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2004). 
BCA guidance should clearly define “what should be included in a business case analysis 
and to establish specific criteria and methods for evaluating PBL support” and “when 
business case analyses should be updated during the weapon system life cycle” (GAO, 
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December 2008). The customer should implement formal oversight procedures as well, 
so that they can evaluate PBL according to a common standard (GAO, 2008a). 
3. Maintaining Capability 
Sometimes, the customer needs to reorganize to become an intelligent customer, 
because they neglect to maintain the ability to implement and evaluate PBL (Chuter, 
2009). Normally, reorganization costs are extremely high; therefore, the customer should 
retain the choice of logistic service methodology so that they keep their ability to assess 
PBL (Boito, Cook & Graser, 2009). To do that, the customer should establish PBL 





1. Cost Reduction 
Though most organizations expect cost reductions as a result of implementing 
PBL, we should be aware that PBL does not always reduce costs, as many empirical 
studies have found. If the government takes no provision to ensure the lowering of costs 
during the drafting of a PBL contract, it is very difficult to reduce costs once the contract 
is in place. We found that, to have the benefit of cost reduction, we should do several 
things: 
a. Cost Data Management 
For cost reduction, cost data management is significant for government. 
The government should collect cost data not only of the PBL contract itself, but also for 
other actions such as maintenance, personnel, facilities, training, administration, 
documentation, technical data, and disposal. Cost data for contracts without PBL are 
really important, because if we do not have those cost data, we cannot find out whether 
we could reduce the cost or not. This idea is very straightforward but, in fact, many 
organizations (including JMSDF) often fail to have total cost data without PBL contracts 
for particular weapon systems.  Once we could have useful cost data, we should track it 
continuously and regularly, because all cost components change rapidly and, if we fail to 
track cost data, risks due to the PBL contract will increase. 
b. Government Should Have the Ability to Evaluate PBL Contracts 
The government should have the ability to evaluate PBL contracts. The 
goal of any contractor is to maximize profits, so the government should not rely on cost 
data management by those contractors. The JMSDF may desire to outsource the 
evaluation of a potential PBL contract, or the business case analysis (BCA), to a third 
party, however, it is difficult for a third party to have accurate and sufficient cost data, 
because they do not have enough access to  all documents and information at the 
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operational squadron level, and it will likely be difficult for a contractor to evaluate costs 
from inside the organization. In addition, some third parties may be untrustworthy or 
incompetent, so if the government has no ability to evaluate PBL contracts, it cannot 
evaluate accurately the reports submitted by those third parties and may subsequently 
enter into a poor, risky contract. Of course, if the government wants to have the ability to 
evaluate PBL contracts, it must bear some costs (e.g., training cost, manning cost and 
investment cost); generally, however, those costs should be smaller than the expected 
cost savings in the prospective PBL contract assuming the business case analysis contains 
proper, thorough and accurate cost calculations. 
c. Government Should Maintain Marginal Administration and 
Technical Skills 
It is very important for government to maintain marginal administration 
and technical skills, because it will lower future contract replacement or switching costs 
and the government should always reserve the option to cancel a contract. If we cut all 
applicable administration and technical skills, we can save money in the short-term, but 
once we lose those skills, the cost and time necessary to rebuild them may be immense. It 
is worth observing that the U.S. Army gave up the PBL contract for the Stryker because 
they could not effectively operate it under wartime conditions, due to increased force 
protection requirements for the contracted laborers on the battlefield; for every contractor 
there was a fixed and variable force protection cost and this drove up the logistical 
requirements as well as the personnel requirements. If we can keep replacement costs low, 
it will give strong incentives to contractors to reduce the cost. If they increase contract 
fees, contractors can expect that government will replace the PBL contract, because the 
government still has the ability to maintain a particular weapon system by itself. 
Second, administration and technical skills are connected directly to the 
ability to evaluate PBL contracts in cost. If we have no administration and technical skills, 
we cannot collect or predict sufficient and appropriate cost data, because we do not have 
the knowledge to maintain a particular weapon system. From this point of view, we can 
also give incentive to contractors to reduce cost if we have marginal administration and 
technical skills, because we can evaluate cost more appropriately. 
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d. Apply Monetary Incentives 
In theory, monetary incentives should work in a PBL contract to reduce 
costs because the cost reductions and improved performance the contractor delivers will 
offset the incentive payments (Sols, Nowicki & Verma, 2008). Empirical studies have 
found that, in some instances, monetary incentives improve performance and lower cost, 
but the exact amount by which performance was increased or costs were reduced is 
uncertain (Kirk & DePalma, 2005). The important conclusion is that the government 
should track the relationship between monetary incentives and performance, so that the 
government can have an appropriate amount of money for incentives. 
2. Risk Premium 
The government cannot calculate the appropriate price of a PBL contract just by 
having all the cost data of contractors, because the government has to take a risk premium 
into account. In PBL contracts, more risks will move from the government side to the 
contractor side as the contract level become higher, so it is natural for government to pay 
some money for contractors to accept some risks. The government should therefore 
consider the appropriate risk premium. Risk premium should not be considered simply as 
a profit of contractors, because contractors have to pay some costs (e.g., management 
cost, insurance cost and training cost) to take on the new risks.  
3. Cost Over Life Cycle Time 
The government should consider the costs, not of one PBL contract, but of all 
PBL contracts that will be made over the life cycle of a particular weapon system. Most 
PBL contracts are long-term; in fact, the JMSDF considers 5-year contracts. However, in 
most cases weapon system life cycles are longer than most PBL contracts or 5 years, so 
the government should have some plan to stretch PBL contracts of particular weapon 
systems over the projected life cycles of those systems. In these plans, the government 
should roughly estimate the increase of PBL contract price, and should have criteria to 
replace a PBL contract with an organic capability. The cost of transitioning from the PBL 
contract to an organic capability should also be recognized as part of the cost of the PBL 
contract at the outset.  
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4. PBL Contract Price and Replacement Cost 
Figure 4 shows the cost of government and contractors, and the margin required 
to increase costs. To simplify this problem, we assume that in this case, contractors will 
do all of the administrative work, maintenance, and logistics for a particular weapon 
system. In Case 0, a PBL contract has not been implemented, so the government has 100 
percent of the capabilities to include administration and technical skills; therefore, the 
estimated replacement cost should be zero. On the other hand, if the government wants 
PBL to reduce the cost, contractors have to offer lower PBL contract prices than the 
actual cost to the government; so, in Case 0, the estimated cost of contractors should be 
lower than the actual cost of government. After a PBL contract begins, because the 
government wants to reduce its total cost, it will remove all the capability for a particular 
weapon system as an overlapped capability and waste. 
In Case 1, the government removed all the capabilities, driving up the estimated 
replacement cost due to this loss of capability. If it wanted to replace PBL, it would have 
to reconstruct facilities, buy or accumulate know-how, recruit soldiers and educate and 
train them; this replacement cost would likely become higher than the annual cost of 
government without a PBL contract over some period of time.  Thus, it would become 
difficult for government to replace a PBL because the replacement cost is so high. On the 
other hand, contractors would have the margin to increase cost (or annual contract price) 
up to the replacement cost. Normally, contractors are very smart; they never overlook this 
margin. Thus, we can easily assume that contractors will increase the contract price in the 
second or third term of a PBL contract. 
In Case 2, a PBL contract is implemented but government retains marginal 
capabilities. In this case, government has to use some money to maintain its marginal 
capabilities, but its cost is not prohibitive because it will reduce the number of its 
employees to just those required to maintain facilities and technical and managerial 
know-how. In fact, in fiscal year 2009, personnel cost accounts for 44.1 percent of the 
defense budget in Japan (Ministry of Defense, 2009). On the other hand, estimated 
replacement cost is also relatively smaller, because the government maintains its 
marginal capability and, if it wants to replace the PBL, it may train or recruit additional 
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personnel to perform the function.17 In Case 2, the government maintains its very skilled 
personnel, so it is relatively easy to educate new personnel. In Case 2 of Figure 4, actual 
annual cost of government plus actual annual cost of contractors is greater than actual 
annual cost of government in Case 0. This assumption is reasonable because many 
empirical studies found no evidence of cost reduction by implementing PBL. If the 
government accepts this cost increase as a compensation for performance improvement, 
this situation is acceptable, but if the government is focused on cost reduction, then it will 
find this situation to be unacceptable. In that case, contractors will have some incentive to 
reduce costs so that the actual annual cost of government plus the actual annual cost of 















G Actual annual cost of government
Estimated replacement cost
Actual annual cost of contractors
Margin to increase annual cost 
Case 0 : Government has 100% of the capability to perform a given 
function and replacement cost is zero. Estimated actual cost 
for the contractor to provide the service is lower than the 
actual cost to the government
Case 1 : Government eliminates 100% of the capability to perform a 
given function and the estimated replacement cost is high. 
Contractor may increase their price up to the capability 
replacement cost of the government.
Case 2 : PBL contract is implemented but government retains some 
marginal level of the capability to perform the given 
function that has been outsourced to the contractor.
 
Figure 4.   Cost of government and contractors, and margin to increase cost from annual 
view point 
 
                                                 
17 Training and recruiting additional personnel to take over a function that has been outsourced may 
require significant time and money and therefore a transition plan or exit clause should be put in place in 
the contract to provide the government with enough time to build the capability necessary to perform the 
function effectively.  
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Figure 5 shows the relationship between organic capability and capability keeping 
cost or PBL replacement cost. Capability keeping cost includes facility maintenance cost 
and cost to maintain know-how as fixed costs, and personnel cost as a variable cost. 
Capability keeping cost will increase or decrease as organic capability increases or 
decreases. If the government removes all of its capability, capability-keeping cost 
becomes zero, but if the government maintains some capability, it needs to assume at 
least the fixed cost. We assume that the capability keeping cost will be linear because 
personnel cost is the only variable. 
PBL replacement cost includes facility construction cost and buying or 
accumulating know-how cost as a setup cost and recruiting cost and retraining cost as 
variable costs. PBL replacement cost is a one-time cost. If government removes all of its 
capability, PBL replacement cost becomes very big, because government has to pay the 
setup cost. PBL replacement cost will be decreased as organic capability increases and 
when government has 100 percent of capability, PBL replacement cost becomes zero. We 
assume that PBL replacement cost goes down in an inverse proportion, because it is 
much easier for 1,000 soldiers than it is for 10 soldiers to retrain 100 soldiers. 
In Figure 4, the total represents capability keeping cost plus PBL replacement cost. 
As the figure shows, at first total cost goes down as organic capability goes up, but at a 
certain point begins to rise as organic capability goes up, so there is a lowest point. If we 
add PBL replacement cost to longer-term capability keeping cost, this lowest point moves 




Figure 5.   Relationship between organic capability and capability keeping cost or PBL 
replacement cost 
Figure 6 combines Figure 4 and Figure 5. Case 2 is the optimal case, and the 
government has to seek this point. The government often considers cost from the 
viewpoint of a single fiscal year viewpoint, so the optimal point is relatively toward the 
right of the figure, but if the government can consider the longer term, it will move from 
right to left, and can save more capability keeping cost and total cost with PBL contract.  
Though the cost is higher in Case 2 than in Case 0, this does not directly mean 
that total cost is higher in Case 2, because PBL often increases service level and can 
increase mission-capable rate, meaning that government needs fewer of each weapon 
system in total. Normally, government decides the number of weapon systems by 
considering the international situation then divides those numbers by mission-capable 
rate; from this, it will estimate the necessary number of weapon systems to possess. So, if 
mission-capable rate goes up, the necessary number of each weapon system will go down, 
and the acquisition cost or holding cost will go down. 
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Figure 6.   PBL price and replacement cost 
B. PERFORMANCE 
1. Performance Measurement Is Important for PBL Contract 
Empirical studies found that a lot of PBL programs achieved high performance 
with a variety of weapon systems (Ahern, 2004; GAO, December 2008; Inspector 
General, Department of Defense, 2006). However, it is difficult to measure the 
performance because appropriate data is not collected. Additionally, it is even more 
difficult to measure the cost for performance—that is, measure the performance for a 
given resource investment. In fact, some studies could not find evidence that PBL 
increased performance (Inspector General, Department of Defense, 2004; Landreth, 
Wilhelm & Corporon, 2005). Performance evaluation is significant in PBL contracts 
because performance is the selling point of PBL. No one can evaluate contractors or the 
price of PBL contracts without evaluating performance appropriately, because we cannot 
bid some goods and services without grasping their capabilities or results. So, under PBL 
contracts, the government should evaluate performance continuously and regularly. The 
government is responsible for checking performance as it checks the number and quality 
of other goods that are delivered by contractors. 
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2. Appropriate Performance Data Are Needed 
One of the most serious problems is that it is difficult to identify an appropriate 
measure of performance. If we cannot find a good measure, we cannot evaluate the 
performance of a PBL contract appropriately. After identifying an appropriate measure, 
we have to collect data constantly because performance of PBL contracts fluctuates every 
time and we may misunderstand the performance by the information from a snapshot of a 
particular time. Therefore, the government has to keep making efforts to correct 
appropriate performance data by good measurement. In this meaning, even if the 
government receives high performance from implementing PBL, that does not always 
mean that government time and effort for logistics will be reduced. 
3. BCA is Necessary To Evaluate PBL 
BCA provides the necessary methods and techniques to evaluate PBL contracts. 
BCA is not just a cost benefit analysis; it is composed of all analyses that are needed to 
evaluate PBL contracts. In other words, BCA is not one particular method, so 
government has to define BCA by itself and has to consider what should be included in 
BCA. BCA includes metrics selection and data collection, so government automatically 
has to continuously update BCA. The more frequently the government updates BCA, the 
more appropriately the government can evaluate PBL contracts and grasp performance of 
PBL. 
The government tends to analyze PBL in the case of peacetime conditions, but it 
should also consider wartime operations in its BCA. Though JMSDF has not experienced 
severe war and most of their operations have been executed under peace situations or 
close to peace situations, JMSDF is designed to operate during war, and has to keep 
maintaining its weapon systems in such situations. Therefore, JMSDF has to collect or 
predict the data under combat conditions and put that information into its BCA. 
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C. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
1. Significance of Selecting Appropriate Metrics 
The most important thing to get correct with PBL is appropriate and effective 
metrics to measure performance. If we fail to select good metrics, the applicability and 
effectiveness of the BCA will be reduced or lost, because BCA is implemented by using 
the information provided by those metrics. For that reason, the government must strive 
toward better metrics. The government has to recognize the difficulty of measurement 
and measurement error, and has to reconfirm the measurement continuously and 
regularly. 
2. Metrics Selection 
It is difficult to find the best metrics for a particular PBL contract in one try; in 
other words, we can have much better metrics after several attempts, so metrics should be 
evaluated and updated periodically. If a particular metric is not effective then it should be 
changed, and efforts made to improve performance metrics so that we can evaluate PBL 
more appropriately. On the other hand, changing performance metrics has implications 
for writing contracts and contract durations because it may be necessary to change the 
metrics in a given contract. For this reason, there needs to be flexibility in the contract to 
change the metric but not so much flexibility as to open up all parts of the contract, which 
would effectively mean a renegotiation that increases costs. The government also has to 
make efforts to reduce the number of trials needed to determine satisfactory metrics; this 
will reduce the opportunities to change contracts and increase costs. To do that, it is 
better for the government to set standardized steps to choosing metrics. 
D. RISK  
1. Risk Sharing 
One of the features of PBL is risk sharing. The contractor will likely charge for 
the cost of taking on risk for the government and the premium for that risk will be 
reflected in the contract price. So, PBL is not such a simple program—there are 
complexities. We should not regard the risk premium as a simple profit for contractors,  
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because it is the value of risk sharing. The government can reduce risks associated with 
inventory, transportation or contingency expenditure caused by particular trouble, and 
contractors sell these risk reductions like insurance companies. 
2. Chain of Command 
There is also risk associated with not having the particular function or service 
directly under the control of the government and therefore subject to the chain of 
command. For example, a dispute must be resolved through civil (or administrative) 
courts as opposed to the direct chain of command (or the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, in the case of the U.S.). 
3. Organization Skills 
Administration and technical skill will more or less drain from the government, 
because contractors will assume some duties that were conducted by government 
employees. If the government loses entire skill sets, replacement cost becomes very high 
and PBL evaluation capability becomes very low. Replacement cost growth means that 
the incentives for the government to replace PBL contracts will decrease and it will be 
difficult for the government to give up PBL; this is because, if replacement cost becomes 
high, it is more difficult to persuade finance sections to replace PBL. If the government’s 
PBL evaluation capability becomes low, the government is more likely to make 
inappropriate and disadvantageous contracts, and once the government makes 
unfavorable contracts, it cannot notice that these contracts are not appropriate. Then 
government will have no option to continuing inappropriate PBL contracts. 
The government should not forget that the government itself is the competitor of 
contractors because it has same skills (before PBL contracts) as competitors have for 
particular weapon systems. If the government loses its skills, the strongest competitor 
will be dismissed, and we can easily predict that the PBL contract price goes up.  
4. Data Sharing 
If PBL contracts expand to cover almost all weapon systems, it becomes harder 
for government to have maintenance and logistics data, either because it does not need to 
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gather data itself or because contractors restrict direct access to the pertinent cost or 
performance data and, generally, charge high rates when they do provide access. If the 
PBL contract expands, the government should analyze it more strictly, because unsuitable 
parts of such a big contract could lead to huge waste. It is something of a paradox 
because the bigger the PBL contract becomes, the more difficulties the customer 
encounters in BCA, leading to inaccurate assessment of PBL. So the government should 
mention data treatment or data ownership in the PBL contracts in order to maintain 
access to data that are needed to implement appropriate BCA. 
There is another problem in data sharing. Security issues may arise in PBL 
contracts, due to governmental need to share a lot of data with contractors. For example, 
if contractors work in the hangars at military air bases, the government may need to take 
certain measures to guard secrets. 
5. Wartime Operations 
Generally, during war, a PBL contract is not suitable because contractors cannot 
fight and they need enough protection by military people, and contractors cannot work in 
the place where safety is not guaranteed. For this reason, contractors cannot work on 
ships. 
E. INFORMATION SYSTEMS  
1. Information Systems to Improve PBL 
We have to shrink the turnaround time of information; for example, if we use 
some parts or some assemblies in our hangar then that information should be sent 
immediately to the contractor so that they may reduce the inventory or turnaround time. 
The inventory or turnaround time reduction in the contractors’ section directory connects 
to the price of the PBL contract, so it is significant not only for contractors but also for 
the government to have immediate information exchange. Information systems must be 
integrated with the work on the shop floor without delay. For example, if maintenance 
work is performed on the shop floor but the usage of spare parts or maintenance man-
hours is not entered into the system until months later then it is impossible to accurately 
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plan and forecast for resources such as parts and labor, and turnaround time goes up. This, 
in turn, can cause safety stock and pipeline stock increase. To avoid this, the government 
should improve information systems for PBL that connect government and contractors. 
RFID and IUID may be very beneficial as mechanisms for transmitting information about 
usage of parts or the status of a weapon system or component. 
2. Information Systems to Evaluate PBL 
An information system is also very important to collect necessary data to evaluate 
PBL contracts, because the government cannot evaluate PBL by its own information 
alone. The government should have some cost and performance data from the 
contractor’s section so that government can implement appropriate BCA. When the 
government collects data, cost and performance data should be collected by standardized 
format so that the government can track those data. This effort will help the government 
to evaluate PBL appropriately and frequently. 
F. WEAPON SYSTEM 
1. Weapon System Selection 
PBL is not right for every situation, so the government should carefully consider 
for which elements they should implement PBL contracts. To select weapon systems for 
PBL, the government should first settle upon the criteria by which they are operating. 
a. Suitable Weapon Systems for PBL  
High-technology weapon systems or components are good for PBL 
contracts, because government people will be released from the burden to understand and 
struggle with such a complicated system in some extent. 
b. Unsuitable Weapon Systems for PBL 
There are some unsuitable weapon systems for PBL. For example, if a 
particular weapon system is very special (i.e., particularly complex or expensive to 
produce and those numbers are very small), such a weapon system is not good for a PBL 
contract, because the contractor feels difficulty in managing spare parts flexibly or 
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reusing the administration skills for such a system. A PBL contract is not good for highly 
reliable, limited-run weapon systems either, because normally, such weapon systems are 
very expensive with very high benefit and risk. The government should not take such a 
gamble. 
2. PBL Contract Level 
The higher the PBL contract level becomes, the more complicated the PBL 
contract becomes, which can cause the government more difficulties. The JMSDF will 
not have trouble understanding the mechanism of PBL in its pilot model, because that 
PBL contract is at the component level, which is not complicated. However, JMSDF is 
considering introducing PBL to the higher-level contracts; if that happens, the incentives 
and risks will become more complicated and JMSDF will feel the increased difficulties. 
For this reason, JMSDF should not raise contract levels until it has given careful thought 
to the complicated issues at each level of PBL contracts. 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY (FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY AND 
COMMAND AND CONTROL) 
1. Government Should Have Policy for PBL 
Government should have a policy for PBL. This policy should include 1) the main 
reason to use PBL contracts (e.g., cost reduction, performance increase or risk sharing), 
2) the roles and responsibility of government and contractors, 3) replacement criteria, 4) 
maximum PBL contract levels for practical-use weapon systems and training weapon 
systems, and so on. If the government does not have a concrete policy for PBL, PBL 
contracts are more likely to be unsuitable. Contractors always have a concrete policy—
maximize profit—so the government may be at a disadvantage if it has no policy for PBL. 
The government should review its policy based upon national security issues, budgetary 
concerns, the latest technologies, business trends, suppliers’ behaviors and their skills or 
knowledge about PBL, and must apply the policy to the PBL contracts. 
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2. Government Should Establish Guidance and Training for PBL and 
BCA 
PBL contracts are complex and difficult to understand for military people, whose 
standard tours of duty (typically 2–3 years) makes it hard for them to study enough about 
PBL before moving on to other jobs. In fact, the officer who is responsible for PBL 
contract in JMSDF has not been able to conduct his own study about PBL by himself. In 
addition, PBL is a very flexible contract approach, so if the officer who takes charge of 
PBL contracts changes, the policy for PBL may be changed entirely. To combat this, the 
government should have a concrete and stable policy for PBL to maintain appropriate 
PBL contracts. It should establish PBL guidance and training so as to maintain the ability 
to manage and evaluate PBL contracts even if the people who are responsible for PBL 
contracts would be changed frequently. The government also should establish the basic 
framework of conditions and terms that should be defined in the contract, to ensure that 
its policy for PBL is spelled out in the contract language. 
For the same reasons, the government should establish BCA guidance that 
supports the officers who take charge of PBL contracts, in order to consider what should 
be included in the BCA and give them some incentive to update the BCA frequently. If 
the government outsources the BCA, it should have BCA guidance, so that BCA 
contractors can work appropriately. The U.S. government has issued many PBL guidance 



















3. Government Should Keep Marginal Administration and Technical 
Skills 
The government can make its logistics and maintenance sections smaller, but it 
should keep the marginal administration and technical skills so that it will not lose the 
ability to implement and evaluate PBL contracts. This also helps cost savings, because 
contractors feel that government can replace a PBL contract relatively easily if it 
maintains its relevant skilled personnel. 
Service PBL guidance documents for the person implementing PBL 
DoD 
Department of Defense. (2005, March). Performance based 
logistics: A program manager’s product support guide. 
Defense Contract Management Agency. (n.d.). Performance 
based logistics (PBL) support guidebook. 
Department of Defense. (2003, November). Business case 
development guide. 
Army 
Department of the Army. (2005, August 18). Performance-based 
logistics (PBL) business case analysis (BCA) policy. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army. (2004, May 4). U.S. 
Army implementation guide performance-based logistics 
(PBL). 
Navy 
Department of the Navy. (2003, January 27). Department of the 
Navy (DoN) performance based logistics (PBL) guidance 
document. 
Naval Inventory Control Point. (n.d.). Maritime PBL deskguide. 
Department of the Navy. (2007, November 6). Department of the 
Navy guide for developing performance based logistics 
business case analyses (P07-006). 
Department of the Navy. (2003, June). Operational availability 
handbook. 
Air Force Secretary of the Air Force. (2004, November 10). Integrated product support planning and assessment. 
Marin Corps Department of the Navy. (n.d.). United States Marine Corps performance based logistics (PBL) guidebook. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. PBL IS NOT A VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD SYSTEM 
The U.S. Department of Defense has stated that PBL is the preferred sustainment 
model for weapon systems. How long the U.S. will continue to pursue PBL as a 
sustainment model is unknown especially given the mixed results of cost and 
performance found in the literature. The JMSDF is shifting from traditional contracts to 
PBL contracts it should not forget that PBL is a complicated contract system because of 
the many variables involved compared to traditional contracts. PBL contracts include not 
only visible goods or service, but also invisible services such as risk sharing; those 
invisible services make it more difficult to grasp PBL contracts. Therefore, many studies 
could not find cost reduction or a relationship between monetary incentives and 
performance. Though it is difficult to understand and analyze PBL, the government 
cannot maintain optimal PBL contracts without tracking appropriate data and analysis. 
B. SEVEN IMPORTANT PREPARATIONS OR CONSIDERATIONS 
The government should consider seven important issues: cost, performance, 
performance metrics, risk, information systems, weapon systems and organizational 
capability. 
1. Cost 
For the cost reduction, cost data management is vital for government. The 
government should collect appropriate cost data and track them continuously and 
regularly. It is better for the government to have the ability to evaluate PBL contracts by 
itself, because contractors or third party evaluators may not evaluate PBL appropriately. 
And the government should maintain marginal administration and technical skills to keep 
the PBL contract price lower and to maintain the ability to evaluate PBL contracts. On 
the other hand, monetary incentives are useful to reduce cost, but the government should 
track cost data and determine the relationship between monetary incentives and 
performance so that it pays reasonable monetary incentives.  
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The government has to understand risk premium, which is not to be considered as 
simple profit for contractors. It is also important for the government to consider matters 
from the viewpoint of the entire life cycle, because PBL contracts’ terms are normally 
shorter than life cycles of most weapon systems, and it is important for the government to 
have some plan, not only for single PBL contracts, but also for all the PBL contracts that 
will be made over the life cycle of a particular weapon system. 
2. Performance 
Performance measurement is important for PBL contracts because performance is 
deliverable under PBL contracts. However, it is difficult to measure performance, so 
government should collect appropriate performance data. BCA is necessary to evaluate 
PBL, but BCA does not require a particular method, so government has to consider what 
considerations it will include in the BCA. Also, the government should implement BCA 
not only for peacetime but also for wartime scenarios. 
3. Performance Metrics 
The most important thing to get correct with PBL is appropriate and effective 
metrics to measure performance; those metrics should be reviewed regularly. If the 
government decides to change some metrics, it may have to change the PBL contract, and 
sometimes that costs money. Therefore, the government should make efforts to reduce 
the number of changes; standardized steps to choose metrics may help government to 
reduce that number. 
4. Risk 
One of the features of PBL is risk sharing, so the government will be released 
from inventory risk or transportation risk to a certain extent. On the other hand, there are 
some risks caused by PBL such as dispute solutions between government and contractors, 
organizational skills drain, data sharing and wartime operations. The government should 
recognize those risks so that it will not fail in PBL. 
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5. Information Systems 
Information systems are significant for PBL because they help to reduce 
turnaround time, which in turn helps both contractors and the government to reduce costs. 
Information systems also help the government to evaluate PBL. 
6. Weapon Systems 
PBL is not a solution for all occasions, so the government should consider for 
which elements it should implement PBL contracts. Generally, high-technology weapon 
systems or components are good candidates for PBL, but low-production special weapon 
systems or highly reliable weapon systems are not suitable for PBL. The government also 
should consider PBL contract levels and understand the differences between each level. 
7. Organization Capability 
The government should have a concrete policy for PBL, because if the 
government does not have a policy, it may make an inappropriate PBL contract. To 
reflect those policies in all PBL contracts, the government should establish guidance and 
training for PBL and BCA. The U.S. government has issued extensive guidance about 
PBL and BCA. It is also important for the government to keep marginal administration 
and technical skills to keep the contract price lower and keep its abilities to evaluate PBL. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
PBL is just starting in JMSDF, so there is much work to do, but the human 
resources remain limited. The JMSDF should solve problems and increase ability 
incrementally. Thus, we classified our recommendations as short-term recommendations 
for up to 5 years into the future, intermediate recommendations for 5 years to 10 years 
into the future, and long-term recommendations stretching over 10 years into the future. 
A. SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. JMSDF Should Understand the Intricacy of PBL 
The most significant issue for JMSDF is to understand clearly about complicated 
PBL mechanisms, which are gradually more complicated as the contract level goes up. 
Cost restraint, performance improvement and risk sharing are interrelated, so JMSDF 
should understand PBL in a general sense. In high contract levels, JMSDF may not be 
able to see evidence of direct cost reduction, but there are some possibilities to identify 
cost reduction if JMSDF understands the mechanisms of PBL and can consider it from a 
wider viewpoint. By understanding PBL, JMSDF will be able to exploit PBL more 
efficiently, and it will be easier to convince taxpayers of its benefits.  
2. JMSDF Should Have Policy for PBL 
On the basis of deep insight about PBL, JMSDF should have develop a concrete 
policy for its use. Though PBL has a variety of expected effects such as cost reduction, 
performance increase, risk sharing and so on, JMSDF should prioritize these effects so as 
not to deviate form the purpose of PBL. 
3. JMSDF Should Have Long-Term Plan for PBL 
After making a concrete PBL policy, JMSDF should make a long-term plan, 
because PBL requires significant efforts to begin, and even greater efforts to replace once 
implemented. First, JMSDF should begin studying PBL without contractors or third 
parties. Even if imperfect, such work should still contribute significantly to implementing 
PBL, using third parties and negotiating with contractors. Second, though it is natural to 
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focus on the rewards of a new program, JMSDF should recognize the risks caused by 
PBL such as chain of command risks, organization skill drain, data sharing risks, etc. To 
avoid or mitigate those risks, JMSDF should evaluate PBL over life cycle time, and 
should generate and maintain at least marginal administration and technical skills. 
B. MIDDLE-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. JMSDF Should Establish Criteria to Decide Whether PBL Should Be 
Used or Not 
JMSDF is planning to spread PBL contracts to entire weapon systems, but they 
should recognize that PBL is not a perfect fit for all systems. Some weapon systems fit 
PBL very well; on the other hand, some weapon systems do not fit PBL. So it is 
important for JMSDF to define precise criteria to decide whether PBL should be used for 
a particular weapon system. 
2. JMSDF Should Consider Exploiting Monetary Incentives 
Incentives are argued to make cost reduction and performance improvement go 
together, though they are incompatible under traditional contract approaches. It is 
difficult for JMSDF to exploit monetary incentives because of the national law 
constraints, but to improve PBL, JMSDF should consider ways to exploit monetary 
incentives. 
3. JMSDF Should Have the Ability to Evaluate PBL by Itself 
As we mentioned, JMSDF should have ability to evaluate PBL by itself. To do so, 
JMSDF should increase the number of personnel who are responsible for PBL, because 
as the number of PBL contracts increases, it becomes impossible to evaluate all these 
contracts with only a few personnel. To increase the number of personnel proficient in 
PBL, JMSDF should make PBL and BCA guidance and training programs; then, the 
personnel who are responsible for PBL will have similar significant knowledge about 




aviation, not only MMC but also 3rd Maritime Service School should study and develop 
PBL and BCA guidance and training programs, and embed PBL training in officers’ 
education in 3rd Maritime Service School. 
4. JMSDF Should Conduct Appropriate BCA Before and After PBL 
Implementation 
BCA should be conducted after a PBL contract starts, but BCA also should be 
appropriately conducted before a PBL contract starts so that JMSDF can grasp the current 
situation under traditional contracts. This initial BCA will help JMSDF to consider PBL 
replacement criteria. 
5. JMSDF Should Improve Information Systems for PBL 
JMSDF should improve information systems for PBL to evaluate and improve 
PBL contracts. They should correct appropriate cost and performance data for efficient 
PBL contracts, and they should specify the data treatment in the contract papers. 
6. JMSDF Should Send Officers to the United States Naval Postgraduate 
School  
Though the officers of JMSDF must be able to understand PBL and conduct PBL 
appropriately by themselves, it is important for the officers to understand a variety of 
economic concepts, such as supply chain management, microeconomics and organization 
behavior to completely understand PBL. There are just a few universities that offer MBA 
courses in Japan, and the National Defense Academy does not have an MBA course 
despite offering a doctoral program. So, it would be beneficial for JMSDF to send 
officers to the United States Naval Postgraduate School to make them study the economy 






C. LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. National Defense Academy Should Have a Business and 
Administration School 
Though we can study in many American or Japanese universities or colleges 
about the economy generally, Japan has a very unique economic culture and JMSDF also 
has a special culture, so to create a Japanese-specific understanding of PBL, the National 
Defense Academy should have a Business and Administration School, which is good not 
only for PBL but also for the entire logistics needs of the Japanese military services. That 
school also can reinforce human resources for logistics in the Japan Self Defense Force. 
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